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THE ESCALATING COPYRIGHT WARS
Peter K. Yu*

INTRODUCTION

Piracy is one of the biggest threats confronting the entertainment
industry today. Every year, the industry loses billions of dollars in
revenue and faces the potential loss of hundreds of thousands ofjobs.' In
2002 alone, it is estimated that the United States lost more than ten
billion dollars due to copyright piracy abroad, not to mention the
significant losses caused by piracy on American soil, notably via the
Internet. a As a result of these losses, piracy disrupts not only the
3
entertainment industry, but also the United States economy.

* Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Intellectual Property & Communications Law
Program, Michigan State University College of Law; Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication,
Information Studies and Media & Faculty Associate, James H. and Mary B. Quello Center for
Telecommunication Management & Law, College of Communication Arts & Sciences, Michigan
State University; Research Associate, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, Centre
for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford. This Article was delivered on April 16, 2003, as part
of the Frontiers in Information and Communications Policy Lectures Series sponsored by the James
H. and Mary B. Quello Center for Telecommunication Management & Law at Michigan State
University. The Article expands on and offers an in-depth analysis of ideas the author articulated in
an earlier column for FindLaw, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing the
Copyright War by Fighting Misdirected Battles, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Aug. 15, 2002), at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020815_yu.html. The Author would like to thank
Steve Wildman and Johannes Bauer for their kind invitation and hospitality.
1. In a recent music conference, the head of the International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry (IFPI) indicated that music piracy had threatened 600,000 jobs in the European music
industry. See Simon Beavis, Record Firms Threaten Big Employers with Action to Combat Piracy,
INDEPENDENT (London) (foreign ed.), Jan. 21, 2003, Business Sec., at 19. If piracy continued at the
current level, it would not be surprising to find a similar number of American jobs jeopardized, if
not more.
2.

See INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, USTR 2003 "SPECIAL 301" DECISIONS ON

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2003), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2003_JuneUSTRLossUp
d.pdf.
3.

See generally STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE

2002 REPORT (2002) (documenting the intertwining relationship between the entertainment industry
and the United States economy), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEKFULL.pdf.
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In July 2002, Congressman Howard Berman introduced the Peer to
Peer Piracy Prevention Act, 4 targeting the piracy problem created by
peer-to-peer networks. This statute, if enacted, would have allowed
movie studios and record companies to hack into personal computers
and peer-to-peer networks when they suspected infringing materials
were being circulated. 5 The Berman bill was subsequently abandoned.6
Congressman Berman's sense of urgency-and perhaps
frustration-was recently picked up by Senator Orrin Hatch, the
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. During a recent
congressional hearing on copyright abuses, Senator Hatch remarked that
"he favor[ed] developing new technology to remotely destroy the7
computers of people who illegally download music from the Internet.",
As he reasoned, damaging someone's computer
"'may be the only way
8
you can teach somebody about copyrights.'
Although the Berman bill and Senator Hatch's remarks were
controversial, they were hardly surprising to those who followed the
entertainment industry closely; rather, they captured well the tone of the
latest copyright war. So far, the industry has been winning. Among its
trophies are the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), 9 Vivendi Universal's defeat and purchase of MP3.com, 10 the

4. H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002). Compare Howard L. Berman, The Truth About the Peer
to Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Why Copyright Owner Self-help Must Be Part of the P2P Piracy
Solution, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Oct. 1, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021001_

berman.html (explaining the need for the proposed legislation), with Julie Hilden, Going After
Individuals for Copyright Violations. The New Bill That Would Grant Copyright Owners a
"License to Hack" Peer-To-Peer Networks, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Aug. 20, 2002), at

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20020820.html (criticizing the proposed legislation).
5. See H.R. 5211.
6. See Jon Healey, Rep. Berman May Not Revive Internet Piracy Bill, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2003, at C3.
7.

Ted Bridis, SenatorFavorsReally PunishingMusic Thieves, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2003, at

2C.
8. Id. (quoting Sen. Hatch); see also Dwight Silverman, Senator's 'Extreme' Curefor Piracy
Is Unconstitutional,HOUS. CHRON., June 21, 2003, at IC.
9. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.). See infra Part L.A for a discussion of the DMCA.
10.

See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 347 (2002); see also

TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 546, 547-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Brad King, MP3.com
Goes
Major
Labels
League,
WIRED
NEWS
(July
20,
2001),
at
http://www.wired.comnews/mp3/0,1285,45377,00.html; Brad King, MP3.com Goes Universal,
WIRED NEWS (May 21, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,43972,00.html; Justin
Oppelaar, Vivendi U Uploads MP3for $370 Mil, DAILY VARIETY, May 21, 2001, at 1.
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movie studios' victory in the DeCSS litigation,1' the bankruptcy and
subsequent sale of Napster and its recent relaunch as a legitimate
subscription-based music service,' 2 the Supreme Court's rejection of the
copyright bargain theory in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 13 and 4the recording
industry's relative success in its mass litigation campaign.
Notwithstanding these victories, the war is expanding and has
become even more difficult for the industry to fight than it was a year
ago. Today, copyright law is no longer a complicated issue that is only
of interest and concern to copyright lawyers, legal scholars, technology
developers, and copyright holders. 15 Rather, it is a matter of public
significance, affecting all of us in our daily lives. The ground has
shifted. If the entertainment industry does not pay attention to the public
and if it continues to use ill-advised battle strategies, it eventually might
lose the war.
Part I of this Article examines the five strategies used by the
entertainment industry to fight the copyright wars: lobbying, litigation,
self-help, education, and licensing. Part II examines the impact of Eldred
v. Ashcrofi on these strategies and examines the decision's ramifications
on future constitutional challenges to copyright laws, in particular the
DMCA. Part III traces recent developments in the international
copyright arena. This Part highlights the substantial differences between
United States and foreign copyright laws. Part IV describes the changing
tone of the ongoing copyright war. This Part suggests that the
proliferation of peer-to-peer networks and the increased public
consciousness of copyright issues have made the war more difficult for
the industry to fight than it was a year ago. Part V concludes by
discussing what the industry should do to stem digital piracy.

11. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435-36 (2d Cir. 2001). DeCSS is
a decryption program that circumvents the Content Scramble System ("CSS") used by the motion
picture industry to protect against the unauthorized reproduction of DVD movies. See id.
12. See Matt Richtel, Napster Says It Is Likely to Be Liquidated,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at
C2. Napster was the defendant in several copyright infringement lawsuits prior to its filing for
bankruptcy protection. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001). For a discussion
of Roxio's relaunch of Napster, see infra Part I.E.
13. See 537 U.S. 186, 214-17 (2003); see also infra Part II.
14. See infra Part I.D.
15. See infra Part IV.
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INDUSTRY STRATEGIES

Battle Strategy #1: Lobbying

Since the turn of the twentieth century, the entertainment industry
has been battling a large array of "new" technologies. As Professor
Litman pointed out,
[T]he contours of [the dispute about intellectual property rights in the
digital environment] don't look very different from the shape of very
similar disputes that arose in the 1980s, when the gods invented
personal computers; or the 1970s, when they invented videocassette
recorders; or the 1960s, when they invented cable television; or the
1920s, when they invented commercial broadcasting and talkies.16

Nonetheless, digital technology is different. Unlike analog technology,
digital technology enables consumers to make exact replicas of the
copyrighted work without losing any quality. 17 Rather than dealing with

low-quality, amateurish cassette tape recordings, copyright infringers
can now produce exactly what CD stores offer.' S Copyright holders,
therefore, are understandably concerned about their continued ability to
control and exploit creative works.
To protect itself, the entertainment industry lobbied Congress
heavily for special protection for works disseminated on the Internet. In

16. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Lawfor the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19, 22
(1996). See generally Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
1885 (2001) (examining the "newness" of the Internet and new communications technologies).
17. See, e.g., 1. Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace,'"55 U. PITT. L.
REv. 993, 1005 (1994) (noting that "[p]hotocopy machines at one time threatened to turn every
individual into a mass publisher, but cyberspace seems actually to have achieved that distinction in
a way that photocopying never really did"); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 264
(2002) (noting that "digital technology makes it possible to make an unlimited number of perfect
copies of music, books, or videos in digital form, and through the Interet individuals may distribute
those digital works around the world at the speed of light"); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and
What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1808-33 (1995) (arguing that the Internet has greatly reduced
the production and reproduction costs of information).
18. For discussions of the threat digital technology posed to the copyright regime, see
generally COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA]; and INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995), available at

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
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1998, Congress enacted the DMCA, 19 which strengthens copyright
protection in the digital medium. The statute prohibits the circumvention
of copy-protection technologies and the dissemination of information
concerning how to defeat those technologies. 20 The DMCA also
provides a "safe harbor" for Internet service providers to remove any
hosted content that allegedly infringes upon the work of a copyright
holder. 2' In addition, the statute protects the integrity of copyright
management systems 22 and revised the performance right regime in light
of changes in the digital environment.23
Since the statute's enactment, the industry has used the DMCA to

prevent the dissemination of information concerning the circumvention

19. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C. (2000)). Professor Litman criticized the DMCA as follows:
The DMCA is long, internally inconsistent, difficult even for copyright experts to parse
and harder still to explain. Most importantly, it seeks for the first time to impose liability
on ordinary citizens for violation of provisions that they have no reason to suspect are
part of the law, and to make noncommercial and noninfringing behavior illegal on the
theory that that will help to prevent piracy.
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 145 (2001). For comprehensive discussions of the DMCA,
see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 137 (1999); Matt Jackson, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: A
ProposedAmendment to Accommodate Free Speech, 5 COMM. L. & POL'Y 61 (2000); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the
DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000); David Nimmer, Appreciating
Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA 's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
909 (2002); David Nimmer, Back from the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualProperty and
the DigitalEconomy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (2001).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
21. See id. § 512(g)(1).
22. See id. § 1202. As Professor Ginsburg summarized:
Section 1202 prohibits: (a) knowingly providing false copyright management
information, with the intent to facilitate or conceal infringement. The provision also
prohibits (b) knowingly or intentionally altering or removing copyright management
information, knowing (or having reasonable grounds to know) that the alteration or
removal will facilitate or conceal infringement. Subsection (c) defines copyright
management information. It includes: the name of the author; the name of the copyright
owner; and the "[t]erms and conditions for use of the work."
Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 157 (alteration in original); see id. at 157-60 (discussing the provision
on copyright management information); see also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (examining
the impact of copyright management mechanisms on the traditional notions of freedom of thought
and expression).
23. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 166-70 (discussing the DMCA amendments to the 1995
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act).
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of encryption technologies. For example, the publisher of hacker
magazine 2600 was enjoined from posting on his website the computer
code that cracked the encryption technology used in protecting DVDs.24
Professor Edward Felten of Princeton University was asked to withdraw
his paper from a scholarly conference, lest he be prosecuted under the
DMCA. 25 And a Russian cryptographer was arrested after giving a
presentation on his company's software that removed security protection
from Adobe e-books.26
Even worse, the DMCA has upset the balance between the interests
of copyright holders and the need for public access to protected
materials. Through its anti-circumvention provision, the statute prevents
people from engaging in actions that traditionally have been considered
fair use.27 The DMCA also creates a chilling effect by requiring Internet

24. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001).
25. See David P. Hamilton, Digital-Copyright Law Faces New Fight, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2001, at BIO. In September 2000, the Secure Digital Music Initiative Foundation issued a public
challenge and offered ten thousand dollars to those who successfully broke its proposed copyprotection technologies. See First Am. Compl., Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, No.
CV-01-2660,
14,
24-34
(D.N.J.
June
26,
2001),
available
at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten-vRIAA/20010626_eff feltenamended_complaint.html.
Professor Edward Felten of Princeton University claimed that he and his research team successfully
broke the proposed technologies. See id. 1 37. When he planned to present his findings at a
scientific conference, the recording industry asked him to withdraw the paper, citing potential
violation of the DMCA. See id. 42-43. In response, Professor Felten filed a lawsuit seeking a
declaratory judgment. See id., Prayer for Relief, A-I. The suit was subsequently dismissed when
the defendants disavowed their threatened lawsuit and the court found that there was "no substantial
threat of real harm of prosecution" by the Attorney General. Tr. of Mots., Felten v. Recording
Indus. Ass'n of America, No. CV-01-2669, at 31, 44, 48 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2001). Although the
industry eventually backed down and Professor Felten was able to present his research, the incident
demonstrated the statute's potential chilling effect.
26. See Jennifer 8. Lee, US. Arrests Russian Cryptographeras Copyright Violator, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2001, at C8 (reporting Sklyarov's arrest); see also Compl., U.S. v. Sklyarov,
No. 5 01 257
(N.D.
Cal.
July
7,
2001),
available
at
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Sklyarov/200lO707_complaint.pdf; Symposium, Panel III:
Implications of Enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Case Study, Focusing on United
States v. Sklyarov, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805 (2002). The charges against

Sklyarov were later dropped in response to strong protests in the United States and in light of his
agreement to testify for the United States government against his former employer, ElcomSoft. See
David Frith, A Promotion a Day Keeps Apple A-weigh, CANBERRA TIMES (Austl.), Jan. 7, 2002, at
A12 (reporting that Sklyarov was released in a deal that "saw him admit the facts of the case but not
any illegal activity"). Subsequently, his Moscow-based employer, ElcomSoft, was prosecuted for
illegally selling software that permitted users to circumvent security features in an electronic book.
See Matt Richtel, Russian Company ClearedofIllegal Software Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2002,
at C4. In December 2002, a federal jury acquitted ElcomSoft of all charges. See id.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 187-88 (2001) (arguing that the anti-

circumvention provision of the DMCA is constitutionally suspect because of the way it limits fair
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service providers to remove content even if the reproduction of such
materials is permissible under existing copyright law. 28 The statute,
therefore, has raised serious concerns about free speech, privacy,
academic freedom, learning, culture, democratic discourse, competition,
and innovation. 29
In light of these weaknesses and problems, legal scholars, college
researchers, cryptographers, technology developers, and civil libertarians
have widely criticized the DMCA. 30 Even some in the technology
industry who originally supported the legislation expressed regret and
disappointment over the development and interpretation of the statute.3'
In short, the law seems to satisfy no one except the entertainment
industry.
B. Battle Strategy #2: Litigation
Apart from lobbying, the entertainment industry has been actively
taking-or threatening to take-legal action against those who allegedly
infringe upon its rights granted under existing copyright law. Although it
is difficult and expensive to go after individual pirates, the industry has
had phenomenal success in lawsuits against companies operating filesharing networks, forcing most of them into shutdown, sale, or
bankruptcy.3 2
In January 2000, MP3.com launched its My.MP3.com service,
which allowed subscribers to play music over the Internet as long as they
owned, borrowed, or purchased the CDs that contain the requested
recordings. 3 To facilitate this service, MP3.com purchased tens of

use); LITMAN, supra note

19, at 145 (arguing that the DMCA would impose liability for

noncommercial and noninfringing behavior).
28. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (requiring Internet service providers to remove material on
the mere allegation of infringement to obtain safe harbor protection).
29. Shortly after the United States Copyright Office released its report on the effects of the
DMCA,

U.S.

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE, DMCA

SECTION

104

REPORT

(2001),

available at

http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-l .pdf,
more
than
fifty
intellectual property law scholars expressed disappointment over the report and urged Congress to
conduct its own study. See IP Law Professors Urge Congress to Do Its Own DMCA Study, WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 16, 2001.

30. See the sources cited supra note 19 for examples of such criticism.
31. See DRM Foes Turn Aside Hollywood Peace Gestures, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 5,
2002.
32. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024-29 (9th Cir. 2001);
see also John Davidson, Battle for the Internet Bazaar, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 25, 2003, at 35

(discussing the KaZaA litigation); Matt Richtel, A New Suit Against Online Music Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at C4 (discussing lawsuits against Grokster and Morpheus/MusicCity).
33. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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thousands of popular CDs and copied them onto computer servers.34
Although MP3.com purchased licenses to perform the music, it did not
own any licenses to reproduce the recordings. 35 As a result, the major
record companies and their artists brought suits against MP3.com,
36
alleging copyright infringement.
In its defense, MP3.com claimed that its service constituted fair
use, 37 contending that its service provided a transformative "space shift"
by allowing subscribers to enjoy the sound recordings they owned
without carrying physical CDs around.38 The defendant also argued that
the My.MP3.com service benefited, rather than harmed, the plaintiffs by
enhancing sales, since the service required subscribers to demonstrate
that they owned, borrowed, or purchased the CDs containing the
requested recordings.39 In addition, MP3.com noted that its service did
not compete directly with the plaintiffs in the digital downloading
market and, instead, "provide[d] a useful service to consumers that, in its
absence, will be served by 'pirates."40
At trial, the court rejected all of the defendant's arguments. The
Copyright Act lists four criteria that a court can apply to determine
whether the defendant's use is "fair." These criteria include:
(1)the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2)the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the
41
copyrighted work.

34. See id.

35. See Litman, supra note 10, at 346.
36.

See TeeVee Toons v. MP3.com, 134 F. Supp. 2d 546, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG

Recordings,92 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4901) (articulating for the first time the concepts that evolved into the fair use doctrine). For
comprehensive discussions of fair use, see generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE
IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed. 1995); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV.
1105 (1990); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions,

and Parody,11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993).
38. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351; cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (finding "time shifting" fair use).
39. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
40. Id.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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The court began by rejecting the defendant's "space shifting"
argument, maintaining that such a service was neither transformative nor
productive. 42 As the court explained, the defendant's argument was
"simply another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being
retransmitted in another medium-an insufficient basis for any
legitimate claim of transformation. ' '43 The court also found that the
second and third factors weighed against fair use because the recordings
the defendant copied were "'close[] to the core of intended copyright
protection '''44 and that the defendant had copied and replayed "the
entirety of the copyrighted works." 45 Finally, the court rejected the
defendant's market enhancement argument by noting that "[a]ny
allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities on plaintiffs' prior
market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly
derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. 4 6 The
court also maintained that a copyright "is not designed to afford
consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to protect the
copyrightholders' property interests., 47 MP3.com lost the lawsuits badly
and was sold shortly afterwards to Vivendi Universal, which
incorporated MP3.com into its subscription service 48 and then sold the
service to Roxio.49
In another well-known lawsuit, the recording industry sued Napster
for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. 50 Napster
42. See UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("[Tjhe goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright ....
") (citation
omitted).
43. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150
F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by the operator of a service that
retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over telephone lines); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters
Television Int'l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by
television news agencies that copied copyrighted news footage and retransmitted it to news
organizations).
44. UMG Recordings, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586) (alteration
in original).
45. Id. at 352.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See the sources cited supra note 10 for further discussion of Vivendi's acquisition of
MP3.com and incorporation of the company into its music service.
49. See Roxio Acquires Pressplayfor $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at C6.
50. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd
in part,rev'd in part,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). For discussions of Napster, see generally Peter
Jan Honigsberg, The Evolution and Revolution of Napster, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2002); Ku, supra
note 17; David G. Post, His Napster's Voice, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 35 (2001); Damien A.
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counterargued that the users' "file sharing" constituted fair use.51 The
Napster case is more complicated than the MP3.com cases because
Napster did not reproduce copyrighted works itself; rather, the service
facilitated unauthorized copying, downloading, transmission, and
distribution of copyrighted works by others.52
Napster was started as a project by a college student, Shawn
Fanning, who was frustrated by the difficulty in finding MP3 files on
traditional Internet servers.53 To alleviate this difficulty, Napster allowed
users to search for music on the hard drives of other users and share
music files with them while the users were on the network.54 As a result
of this peer-to-peer network, Napster successfully transformed faraway
computers into a large file-sharing network-or some would say piracy
network."
At trial, the district court concluded that the record companies had
established a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement by
Napster users. As the court explained, "virtually all Napster users engage
56
in the unauthorized downloading or uploading of copyrighted music.

The court then moved on to address the four fair use factors specified in
the Copyright Act. The court noted that the first factor weighed against
fair use, because Napster's users were neither using the copyrighted
works in a transformative way nor did they attempt to use the songs for
parody or for research.5 7 Rather, users were merely copying and
listening to the music. 58 Likewise, the second and third factors weighed

against fair use, because music is creative in nature and because users
downloaded entire songs. 59 Finally, although the court concluded that the
use was not "paradigmatic commercial activity," the "vast scale" of filesharing facilitated by Napster could not be considered private use or
Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright
Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761 (2001); Symposium, Beyond Napster:
Debating the Future of Copyright on the Internet, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (2000); Symposium,
Beyond Napster-The Future of the Digital Commons, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 257 (2002);
Symposium, Napster: Innocent Innovation or Egregious Infringement?, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
1 (2002); and Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology,
Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247 (2001).
51. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 900-01.
52. Seeid. at911.
53. Seeid at 901-02.

54. See id.
at 905-08.
55. See Susan Stellin, Napster Use Quadrupled in 5 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at
C6 (indicating that 4.9 million Americans accessed the network in July 2000).
56. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
57. Seeid. at912.
58. Seeid. at914.
59. Seeid. at913.
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personal use "in the traditional sense., 60 As the court explained, "the fact
that Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have to
61
buy suggests that they reap economic advantages from Napster use."
Even though the activity was not for profit, it was certainly economic in
nature.
To boost its case, the record companies presented evidence of a
decline in CD sales at highly wired college campuses and campuses that
had banned Napster use.62 According to the study, sales near these
college campuses dropped by twelve to thirteen percent from 1997 to
2000, although CD sales nationwide had risen by eighteen percent,63
thus implying that the decline in sales resulted from MP3 downloads that
replaced CD purchases. The recording industry also argued that the
availability of free downloading reduced the market for competing
commercial downloading, and that free downloading deprived copyright
holders of royalties for downloading even if it enhanced CD sales.64
Based on this evidence, the court found that the effect of the use upon
the value of the work and potential markets for the work weighed against
fair use.65 According to the court, Napster harmed the market for
copyrighted music by reducing CD sales among college students
and by
66
raising barriers to entry in the market for digital downloading.
The district court ordered Napster to shut down. 67 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit was more sympathetic to Napster and found that Napster
was capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.68
Nonetheless, the appellate court concluded that "sufficient knowledge
exist[ed] to impose contributory liability when linked to demonstrated
infringing use of the Napster system." 69 As the Ninth Circuit reasoned,
"[t]he record supports the district court's finding that Napster has actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system,
that it could block access to the system by suppliers of the infringing
material, and that it failed to remove the material. 70
60. Id. at 912.
61. Id.
62. Seeid. at 909-10.
63. See Ku, supra note 17, at 289 (citing Report of Michael Fine for Plaintiffs at 2,
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), availableat http://www.

riaa.com/news/filings/pdf/napster/fine.pdf).
64. See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 915.

65. See id.
66. See id. at913.

67. See id.at 927.
68. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1022.
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The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the lower court, which
subsequently ordered Napster to police its system and to block access to
infringing material after it was notified of such material's location.7'
Unable to do so, Napster shut down its service in July 2001 and has
since filed for bankruptcy protection.72
In November 2002, Roxio, a manufacturer of CD- and DVDcopying software, purchased Napster's name and intellectual property
assets.73 A few months later, Roxio acquired PressPlay, the online music
service, from Vivendi Universal and Sony Music. 74 After much
anticipation and speculation, Roxio finally relaunched Napster in
October 2003 as a subscription-based service featuring music from the
five major record labels.7 5
C. Battle Strategy #3: Self-Help
The third strategy the entertainment industry uses concerns the
deployment of copy-protection technology, such as encryption,7 6 digital
watermarking,77 and the use of trusted systems. 8 Consider encryption,
for example. By encrypting copyrighted works, the industry successfully
prevents the general public from reproducing its products without
authorization. After all, it takes a tremendous amount of skill and time
for an ordinary user to crack copy-protection technology.
71. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2186, at *5-*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
72. See Richtel, supra note 12.
73. See Roxio Buys Napster Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at CIO.
74. See Roxio Acquires Pressplayfor$40 Million, supranote 49.
75. John Borland, Napster Launches, Minus the Revolution, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 9, 2003),
at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5088838.htm.
76. As the recent National Research Council study explained:
Cryptography is a crucial enabling technology for IP management. The goal of
encryption is to scramble objects so that they are not understandable or usable until they
are unscrambled. The technical terms for scrambling and unscrambling are "encrypting"
and "decrypting." Encryption facilitates IP management by protecting content against
disclosure or modification both during transmission and while it is stored. If content is
encrypted effectively, copying the files is nearly useless because there is no access to the
content without the decryption key. Software available off the shelf provides encryption
that is for all practical purposes unbreakable, although much of the encrypting software
in use today is somewhat less robust.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at 156.
77. "While [digital watermarking] does not prevent the content from being copied and
redistributed, this technique can at least make evident who owns the material and possibly aid in
tracking the source of the redistribution." Id. at 83.
78. See id. at 167-71. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights
Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1251 (2000) (discussing hardware-based
identifiers and trusted systems).
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Notwithstanding these technologies, however, the entertainment
industry remains vulnerable. 79 Although copy-protection technologies
allow copyright holders to lock up their creative works, these
technologies lose their protective function when they are decrypted.
Thus, once hackers defeat the technology, the general public can take
advantage of the hackers' breakthrough and make copies without the
copyright holders' permission. 80 They also can share illegal copies freely
with others via websites, file-swapping software, and peer-to-peer
networks.
To prevent the public from doing so, the industry must constantly
upgrade its encryption technologies. Unfortunately, such upgrading
would attract more attention from hackers, who are just too eager to
crack the latest encryption technology available. 8 1 Ultimately, the
repeated encryption and decryption will create a vicious cycle in which
the entertainment industry and the hacker community engage in an
endless copy-protection arms race.82 Instead of devoting resources to

79. Although the industry might remain vulnerable, copy-protection technology does not
necessarily need to be perfectly robust:
Most people are not technically knowledgeable enough to defeat even moderately
sophisticated systems and, in any case, are law-abiding citizens rather than determined
adversaries. TPSs [Technical protection services] with what might be called "curb-high
deterrence"-systems that can be circumvented by a knowledgeable person-are
sufficient in many instances. They can deter the average user from engaging in illegal
behavior and may deter those who may be ignorant about some aspects of the law by
causing them to think carefully about the appropriateness of their copying. Simply put,
TPSs can help to keep honest people honest.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supranote 18, at 218.
80. The hacker's breakthrough need not necessarily take the form of a computer program, to
which the general public might not have ready access even if it is made available on the Internet.
For example, a Princeton University computer science graduate student recently posted a paper on
his website explaining how to disarm SunnComm's copy-protection technology by pushing the shift
key when loading a CD into a computer. See John Borland, Student Faces Suit Over Key to CD
Locks, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 9, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5089168.html.
81. See,
e.g.,
Dorothy
E.
Denning,
Hacker
Ethics,
at
http://www.southemct.edu/organizations/rccs/resources/research/security/denning02/introduction.ht
ml (stating that "hackers do it for the challenge, thrill, and social fun") (last visited Feb. 29, 2004);
The
Mentor,
The
Conscience
of
a
Hacker
(1986),
at
http://cybercrimes.net/Property/Hacking/Hacker/20Manifesto/HackerManifesto.html
(declaring
that "[mjy crime is that of curiosity.... My crime is that of outsmarting you").
82. As Professor Ku explained:
[C]opy protection for digital content necessitates an expensive technological arms
race .... Given the difficulty of protecting digital works from copying, copyright
holders will be forced constantly to spend significant resources developing technology
just to keep the cat in the bag. These costs will in turn be passed on to the public, not to
provide the public with access to new works, but for the sole purpose of limiting access.
Given that hackers appear to be as adept, if not more so, at picking the locks of copyright
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developing artists and improving products, the industry would have to

invest these rare resources in encryption technology and in preventing
consumers from accessing copyrighted works. This strategy would hurt

artists, the industry, and ultimately consumers.
Moreover, the increased use of encryption technologies to protect
copyright has sparked concerns among consumer advocates and civil

libertarians. 83 An encrypted CD may not function the same way as a
conventional CD. Previously available functions, including those to

which consumers may have a legal right-under the "fair use" privilege
in copyright law perhaps-may no longer exist.84 Even worse, an

encrypted CD might not be playable on car stereos, computers, and old
CD players, forcing consumers to buy new ones they do not otherwise
need or cannot afford.8 5 Thus, it is not surprising that the recording
industry has encountered highly negative responses-including a lawsuit
by two California consumers-when Sony released Celine Dion's album
in encrypted format.8 6 As some consumer advocates demanded, record
companies should label their CDs carefully to avoid confusion and to
allow consumers to choose whether they want to purchase those CDs.87
D.

Battle Strategy #4: Education

The fourth strategy the entertainment industry uses is education. In
recent years, the industry has been very active in educating the
consuming public. For example, the recording industry set up the "Byte

protection as those trying to lock up digital works, the costs associated with a copy
protection arms race would be unending.
Ku, supra note 17, at 319-20 (footnotes omitted); see also Trotter Hardy, Property(and Copyright)
in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 217, 251 (discussing the "wasteful 'arms race' of
technological-protection schemes, with each side increasing its spending to outperform the other's
technology").
83. See, e.g., Liza Klaussmann, Watchdog Rips Distribs' Coding, DAILY VARIETY, June 2,
2003, at 10 (noting that a watchdog group filed suit to prevent distribution of encrypted CDs in
France); see also Kevin Hunt, Record Industry Opens Attack on Consumer Rights, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 23, 2002, at 21.
84. For example, consumers may no longer be able to make archival backups or analog
compilations of copyrighted songs for personal use.
85. See George Cole, Celine Dion and the Copycats, FIN. TIMES (London), July 19, 2002, at
11.
86. See Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2002, at CI (reporting that "[tiwo California consumers already have filed a class-action
lawsuit against the five major record companies, alleging that copy-protected CDs are defective
products that shouldn't be allowed on the market").
87. In 2003, Congressman Richard Boucher introduced the Digital Media Consumers' Rights
Act to help restore the historical balance in copyright law and to ensure proper labeling of copyprotected CDs. See H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003).
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Me" website to stem the distribution of illegal copies of popular music in
MP3 format.8 8 "Entertainment groups [also] have sent thousands of
letters to colleges and corporations, alerting them to infringements,"
while celebrities like the Dixie Chicks and Missy Elliott have appeared
on MTV and BET to relay artists' concerns. 89 Even Madonna chastised
her fans for downloading an illegal copy of her new single, American
Life.90 And most recently, during the 2004 Annual GRAMMY Awards
Ceremony, the Recording Academy unveiled a major public education
campaign, which includes the new website whatsthedownload.com, print
and radio public service announcements, grassroots initiatives, and retail
activities. 9 1
Since September 2003, the entertainment industry has tried another
education strategy-mass litigation. So far, the recording industry has
filed more than two thousand lawsuits against individuals suspected of
swapping music illegally via peer-to-peer networks. As Cary Sherman,
president of the Recording Industry Association of America, declared,
"'lawsuits are a very potent form of education."' 92 Although CD sales
have increased since the filing of lawsuits and some studies have shown
that illegal file sharing has declined, 93 it remains unclear
as to whether
94
the lawsuits have the proclaimed educational value.
88. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at 308 n.3.
89. EntertainmentIndustry Widens War, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2003, at 9D.
90. See Lev Grossman, It's All Free!, TIME, May 5, 2003, at 60.
91. Press Release, Recording Academy, "What's the DownloadsM' ' Consumer Education
Campaign Addressing the Value of Paying for Music Unveiled at 46th Annual Grammy®D Awards,
(Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://www.whatsthedownload.com/worddocs/WhatsTheDownload_
Launch Press Release.doc.
92. Benny Evangelista, Online Music Finally Starts to Rock 'n' roll, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29,
2003, at El.
93. See, e.g., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SHARP DECLINE IN Music FILE
SWAPPERS: DATA MEMO FROM PIP AND COMSCORE MEDIA METRIX (2004) (reporting a survey that

showed that the percentage of music file downloaders had fallen to fourteen percent (about eighteen
million users) from twenty-nine percent (about thirty-five million) in spring 2003), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PlP FileSwappingMemo 0104.pdf. But see Marguerite
Reardon, Oops! They're Swapping Again, CNET NEWS.COM (Jan. 16, 2004), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5142382.html (reporting survey by The NPD Group, an
independent market research firm, that "peer-to-peer usage was up 14 percent in November 2003
from September").
94. Commentators have attributed the recent increase in record sales to such other factors as
an improving economy, a better selection of artists and albums, and an increasing tendency to deny
downloading activities. See, e.g., Chris Nelson, CD Sales Rise, but Industry Is Too Wary to Party,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, atCI (noting the recent improvement in selection of artists and albums);
see also COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
SPECIAL PROBLEM OF DIGITAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29 (2004) (noting that factors other than

file sharing appear to have played a part in recent revenue declines experienced by the music
industry), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report dcc.pdf; FELIX OBERHOLZER &
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E. Battle Strategy #5: Licensing
The final strategy the entertainment industry has used-recently
and reluctantly-is licensing. In April 2003, Apple Computer unveiled a
new online music service, the iTunes Music Store, offering low-priced
music downloads from the five major record labels. 95 In October, a few
months after Apple introduced iTunes, Roxio relaunched Napster as a
subscription-based music service.96 Napster has since announced deals
with the Pennsylvania State University and the University of Rochester
to provide students with campus-wide subscriptions to its service.97
From the industry's standpoint, both iTunes and Napster provide an
exciting opportunity. While these services offer legal alternatives to
KaZaA, Grokster, Morpheus, and other allegedly illegal file-sharing
networks, they also help students and computer users develop habits that
the industry hopes will continue. As Napster's former President Michael
Bebel proclaimed, "'[t]his deal encourages a new generation to try a
legitimate service, enjoy and 98
adopt it, and later when they have more
time and money, continue it.'
So far, customers seem to be generally satisfied with these services.
For example, one iTunes customer remarked that "'[the service has]
solved all my problems.'

. .

. 'It's so fast, and there's no guilt, no

recriminations."' 99 By using legitimate services, customers also save
time and avoid those decoy files, spywares, viruses, and computer
crashes that often come with illegal downloads.10 0 Nevertheless, there

KOLEMAN STRUMPF, THE EFFECT OF FILE SHARING ON RECORD SALES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

(2004) (showing that file sharing has only had a limited effect on record sales), available at
http://www.unc.edu/-cigar/papers/FileSharingMarch2004.pdf.
95. See Laurie J. Flynn, Apple Offers Music Downloads with Unique Pricing,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2003, at C2.
96. See John Borland, Napster Launches, Minus the Revolution, CNET NEWS.COM (Oct. 9,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5088838.html. The service offers ninety-nine cent
downloads of single songs to anyone who downloads the free software. It also provides monthly
subscribers with access to an unlimited number of music streams and "tethered" downloads that
expire when the users stop subscribing to the service.
97. See John Borland, Napster to Give Students Music, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 6, 2003), at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5103557.html; see also John Borland, Colleges Explore Legal Net
Music Setups, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 1, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5059030.html.

98. Borland, Napster to Give Students Music, supra note 97.
99. Amy Harmon, In Fight Over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a Carrot,N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 2003, at Al.
100.

See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331, 432-33 (2003)

(discussing the frustration in locating what one wants in illegal websites); see also DIGITAL
DILEMMA, supra note 18, at 80-81.
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remain questions as to whether the purchased songs are resaleable,' 0
will
whether the delivery format is secure,10 2 and whether consumers
10 3
devices.
playback
the
for
service
receive the needed support
II. ELDRED V. AsHCROFT
While the entertainment industry was busy fighting the copyright
war, the Supreme Court was considering what many industry analysts
believed to be one of the most important copyright cases in United States
history. On January 15, 2003, the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 10 4 upholding the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act' 05
("Bono Act"). Dubbed the "Mickey Mouse Protection Act" by its
07

opponents,

06

the statute extended the copyright term for twenty years.1

As with prior copyright term extension legislation, the Bono Act applies

101. See, e.g., Ina Fried & Evan Hansen, Apple: Reselling iTunes Songs 'Impractical"CNET
NEWS.COM (Sept. 8, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027_3-5072842.html (stating that
"Apple's position is that it is impractical, though perhaps within someone's rights, to sell music
purchased online"); Alorie Gilbert, iTunes Auction Treads Murky Legal Ground,CNET NEWS.COM
(Sept. 3, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-5071108.html (discussing the legal and
technical challenges concerning the resale of iTunes through Internet auctions); Evan Hansen, Apple
Customer Resells iTunes Song, CNET NEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2003), at http://news.com.com/21001027-5074086.html (reporting a customer's successful resale of online song he purchased from
Apple Computer's iTunes Music Store).
102. See, e.g., John Borland, Program Points Way to iTunes DRM Hack, CNET NEWS.COM
(Nov. 24, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5111426.html (discussing a program that
"served as a demonstration of how to evade, if not exactly break, the anticopying technology
wrapped around the songs sold by Apple in its iTunes store").
103. See, e.g., Chris Ayres, Apple Acts After Battery of iPodComplaints, TIMES (London), Jan.
12, 2004, at 9 (discussing iPods' battery problems); Rene A. Guzman, Apple's PortableiPodRotten
to Some, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Feb. 20, 2004, at IF (discussing the class action lawsuits
filed against Apple Computer alleging that the company misrepresented the battery life of its iPod).
104. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For discussions of the implications of Eldred for copyright law, see
generally Marci Hamilton, Now That the Supreme CourtHas Declined to Limit CopyrightDuration,
Those Who Want to Shorten the Term Need to Look at Other Options, Including Constitutional
at
(Feb.
13,
2003),
FINDLAW'S
WRIT
Amendment,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030213.htmIl; Peter K. Yu, Four Remaining Questions
About Copyright Law After Eldred (Feb. 2003), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2003-all/yu2003-02-all.html [hereinafter Yu, Four Remaining Questions]; and Peter K. Yu, Mickey Mouse,
Peter Pan, and the Tall Tale of Copyright Harmonization, IP L. & BUS., Apr. 11, 2003, at 24
[hereinafter Yu, Mickey Mouse, PeterPan].
105. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304
(2000) and other scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
106. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's FirstAmendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065

(2001).
107. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2000).

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:907

to both future and existing works.1 08 Works that are supposed to fall into
the public domain, like Disney's Mickey Mouse, therefore will remain
"locked up" for another twenty years.
In 1999, several publishers and users of public domain works
challenged the Bono Act before the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 10 9 The case turned on the meaning of the
Copyright Clause, which provides that "Congress shall have Power...
To promote the Progress of Science ... , by securing for limited Times
to Authors ...the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." 110 The
plaintiffs argued that Congress exceeded its enumerated power by
disregarding the "limited Times" requirement under the Copyright
Clause and that the retroactive extension violated the public trust
doctrine."' They also contended that the Bono Act violated their free
speech rights by preventing dissemination of copyrighted
works that
2
otherwise would have entered the public domain."l
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' First Amendment argument
by observing that "there are no First Amendment rights to use the
copyrighted works of others."''13 In addition, it maintained that Congress
had not violated the "limited Times" provision because the life-plusseventy term conferred by the Bono Act is limited and within Congress's
discretion. 14 The court also noted that the retroactive extension did not
violate the public trust doctrine, which "applies to navigable waters and
not copyrights.""'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the lower court's decision. Like the lower court, the
appellate court found the Bono Act constitutional, 1 6 maintaining that the
plaintiffs' First Amendment argument was foreclosed by Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,"7 a 1985 case involving the
unauthorized publication of President Ford's memoirs.' 18 In that case,
the United States Supreme Court declared that the idea-expression

108. Compare Pub. L. No. 105-298 § 102(b)-(d), 112 Stat. at 2827-28, with, e.g., An Act for
the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976).
109. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999), affd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir.

2001).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl.8; see also Eldred,74 F. Supp. 2d at 2.
See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 2.
See id.
Id. at 3.
Seeid.
Jd. at 4.
See Eldred,239 F.3d at 380.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Seeid. at542.
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dichotomy in copyright law struck "'a definitional balance between the
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts [and ideas] while still protecting an author's
expression."' 1 19 Based on Harper & Row, the court maintained that
copyrights 120are "categorically immune" from First Amendment
challenges.

The appellate court also found irrelevant the plaintiffs' originality
argument.12 As the court explained, "[h]ere we ask not whether any
work is copyrightable-indeed, the relevant works are already
copyrighted-but only whether a copyright may by statute be continued
in force beyond the renewal term specified by law when the copyright
was first granted., 122 Finally, the appellate court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the term "limited Times" should be interpreted in light of
the Copyright Clause's preceding phrase "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."' 123 As the court reasoned, the plaintiffs'
argument was inconsistent with prior case law holding that the
introductory language of 24the Copyright Clause did not constitute a limit
on congressional power.1

The plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing en banc, but the D.C.
Circuit denied their petition. 125 In February 2002, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear the case. 126 A year later, the Court found, in a
7-2 decision, that Congress had made a rational judgment to extend the
copyright term for both existing and future works.' 27 Writing for the
majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that the Court was not in a
position to "second-guess" the legislature's "policy
judgment[]...
' 28
however debatable or arguably unwise [it] may be."'
Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer dissented. Justice
Stevens found that ex post facto extension of the copyright term
frustrated the goal of the Copyright Clause by transferring wealth from

119.

Id. at 556 (quoting with approval, and reversing on other grounds, 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d

Cir. 1983)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (stipulating that copyright does not protect "any
idea").
120. Eldred,239 F.3d at 375 (citing United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
121. Seeid. at377.
122. Id.

123.

Id. at 377-78.

124.

See id. at 378 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

125.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

126.
127.
128.

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002), amended by 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206-07.
Id. at 208.
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the public to copyright holders.129 Similarly, Justice Breyer declared that
"[n]o potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a
tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long
enough for the copyright extension to matter.' 30 In addition, as Justice
Breyer noted, the Bono Act will pose serious harm to society: "It will
likely restrict traditional dissemination of copyrighted works. It will
likely inhibit new forms of dissemination through the use of new
technology. It threatens to interfere with efforts to preserve our Nation's
historical and cultural heritage 3and efforts to use that heritage, say, to
educate our Nation's children."' '
Although the public domain activists found the ruling
disappointing, the decision was neither groundbreaking nor different
from prior Supreme Court precedents in the field of copyright law. 13 2 In
fact, the Court found it significant "that early Congresses extended the
duration of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights.' 33 As
Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Congress's action was strongly supported
history, and precedents in
by the text of the Constitution, the country's
134
the fields of both copyright and patent law.
Prior case law also revealed that the Court has always shown
substantial deference to Congress in copyright matters. 35 For example,
in Stewart v. Abend,136 a 1990 case concerning the renewal provisions
and the right to use a short story in Alfred Hitchcock's Rear Window, the
Court stated: "Th[is] evolution of the duration of copyright protection
tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces .... [I]t is not our role
to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.' 37 In the
famous 1984 Betamax case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 3 8 the Court maintained that "it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of [rights] that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access
to their work product."' 139 And in Graham v. John Deere Co.,140 a case
129. See id. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 266.
132. See Yu, FourRemaining Questions, supranote 104.
133. Eldred,537 U.S. at 201.
134. See id. at 199-201 & nn.5-6.
135. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudenceof
Deference, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 317 (2000).
136. 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
137. Id. at 230.
138. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
139. Id. at 429.
140. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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upon which the Eldred Court relied heavily, the Court stated: "Within
the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course,
implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting ' 4the policy
which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.' '
The only recent case that seeks to limit Congress's enumerated
power in the copyright field is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.,142 a 1991 case involving the copyrightability of
telephone white pages. 143 However, the Court carefully distinguished the
present case from Feist. As the Court explained, Feist "did not touch on
the duration of copyright protection. Rather, the decision addressed the
core question of copyrightability ....The decision did not construe the
and the originality
'limited Times' for which a work may be protected,
' 44
requirement has no bearing on that prescription."'
Notwithstanding the Court's "traditional" copyright analysis in
Eldred, the Court rejected emphatically the petitioners' First
Amendment argument and reminded us of the various "built-in First
Amendment accommodations" in existing copyright law.1 45 For
example, the idea-expression dichotomy prevents copyright holders from
monopolizing ideas, theories, facts, and concepts.146 The fair use
141. /d.at 6.
142. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
143. See id. at 342.
144. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003).
145. Id. at 218-19. For excellent discussions of the relationship between copyright law and the
First Amendment, see generally Floyd Abrams, FirstAmendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 1 (1987); C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891 (2002); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000); Robert C. Denicola,
Copyright and Free Speech: ConstitutionalLimitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 283 (1979); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180
(1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002);
David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the FirstAmendment After Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. REV. 983 (1986); Rodney A. Smolla, Information as
Contraband:The FirstAmendment and Liabilityfor Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099
(2002); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the FirstAmendment: A GatheringStorm?, 19 COPYRIGHT
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43 (1971); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/ExpressionDichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J.
393 (1989); and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplacesand the Bill ofRights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992).
146. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."). The idea-expression dichotomy "is
the term of art used in copyright law to indicate the elements in a copyrighted work which the grant
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provision allows the general public to use copyrighted materials under
certain circumstances without the copyright holder's authorization. 147 In
fact, the Bono Act contains an exception for libraries, archives, and
similar institutions to reproduce, distribute, display, or perform certain
copyrighted works in facsimile or digital form for preservation,
scholarship, and research purposes during the last twenty years of the
copyright term. 148
Much to the disappointment of public domain activists, the Court
also rejected the petitioners' "copyright bargain" theory, 149 the
originality argument,' 50 and the allegation that Congress sought to

achieve a perpetual term on an "installment plan." 151 As the Court
explained, "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the freedom to
make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches.' ' 152 The
of the copyright monopoly does not take from the public." Howard B. Abrams, Copyright,
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 563 (1983). It "'strike[s] a definitional balance.., by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression."' Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting with approval, and reversing on other
grounds, 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)). For discussions of the idea-expression dichotomy, see
generally Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990); Robert A.
Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 560
(1982); Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1221 (1993); and Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56
TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989). See also Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d
Cir. 1936) ("[l]t is convenient to define such a use by saying that others may 'copy' the 'theme,' or
'ideas,' or the like, of a work, though not its 'expression."'); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("[T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where [creative
works] are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,'
to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended."); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis ofCopyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.325, 347-49 (1989)
(discussing the economic rationale for the idea-expression dichotomy).
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (articulating for the first time the concepts that evolved into the fair
use doctrine). For comprehensive discussions of fair use, see generally the sources cited supra note
37.
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(1) (2000); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220.
149. See Eldred, 537 U.S.at 214-17.
150. See id. at 211.
151. See id.at 209 n.16; cf The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearings on S.483
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 72 (1995) (remarks of Prof. Peter Jaszi)
(discussing "perpetual copyright on the installment plan").
152. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221; see also Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 701 (2000) [hereinafter
Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension] (remarks of Prof. Jane Ginsburg) (expressing doubt
about whether the First Amendment "is about the freedom to make other people's speeches again
for them").
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Bono Act "does not oblige anyone to reproduce another's speech against
the carrier's will. Instead, it protects authors' original expression[s] from
unrestricted exploitation." 53 Although the Court ultimately
"recognize[d] that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared
copyrights 'categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment,"' 154 its Eldred decision might create substantial difficulties
for future constitutional challenges to the copyright statute.
Thus, many commentators are concerned that the decision might
create setbacks to potential challenges to other copyright statutes, such
as the DMCA, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 55 or potential
database protection legislation. 56 Some commentators, however, are
more optimistic and suggested that Eldred might offer hope for potential
constitutional litigants. At the end of the decision, the Court seemed to
imply that further First Amendment inquiry may be necessary "when...
Congress has.., altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection."'' 57 Based on this wording, Professor Jack Balkin suggested
in his weblog that the DMCA is constitutionally suspect, for the statute
takes away such traditional public interest safeguards
as the idea58
expression dichotomy and the fair use privilege.'
Notwithstanding this insightful observation, it is unclear whether
the Court would find that the DMCA had altered "the traditional
contours of copyright protection." After all, Congress has enacted a lot
of "nontraditional" legislation in the past. For example, the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984159 created new sui generis

153. Eldred,537 U.S. at 221.
154. Id. (quoting and affirming Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 375).
155. Pub. L. No. 103-465 §§ 511-514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974-81 (1994) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 1101, and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A).
156. For discussions of the expediency and constitutionality of United States database
protection legislation, see generally Yochai Benkler, ConstitutionalBounds of DatabaseProtection:
The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15

BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database
Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First

Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual PropertyRights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir,
Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and
Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999); and Peter K. Yu, Evolving Legal Protectionfor

Databases(Dec. 2000), at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2000/yu-2000-12.html.
157. Eldred,537 U.S. at221.
158. See Jack M. Balkin, Is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Unconstitutional Under
Eldred
v.
Ashcroft?
(Jan.
18,
2003),
at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003 01 12 balkin-archive.html#87596430.
159. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000).
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protection for mask works that might otherwise fail to secure copyright
protection. 60 The anti-bootlegging provision of the copyright statute
affords protection to works that are not fixed within the definition of the
Copyright Act.' 6 1 To allow the United States to comply with the World

Trade Organization framework and the Agreement on Trade-Related
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act of 1994 added protection to materials that were
withdrawn from the public domain.162 And most recently, Congress
extended copyright-like protection to boat hull designs by passing the
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act,' 63 which reversed the 1989 Supreme
Court decision of Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 164 It is
very unlikely that the Court will invalidate all of these statutes, just as it
was unlikely that the Court would invalidate all the copyright statutes
that were enacted since 1790.
III.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

In Eldred, the Court openly embraced the United States' need to
harmonize its copyright law with that of the European Union. As the
Court observed, "a key factor"'165 in the passage of the Bono Act was the
Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the
Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 166 which
instructed member states of the European Union to extend copyright
protection for an additional twenty years. 167 Based on this observation,
one might assume that the Bono Act successfully harmonized United
States copyright law with that of the European Union. Unfortunately, the
opposite is true. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the United
States and the European Union provide different copyright terms for a

160. See id
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); cf United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.
1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the federal anti-bootlegging statute).
162. Pub. L. No. 103-465 § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 104A).
163. Pub. L. No. 105-304 §§ 501-505, 112 Stat. 2860, 2905-18 (1998) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332).
164. See 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989) (invalidating the Florida statute that protects against the
copying of boat hull designs).
165. Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003).
166. 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 [hereinafter EC Copyright Term Directive]. See generally Silke von
Lewinski, The EC Duration Directive and Its Legislative Background, in EXTENDING MICKEY'S
LIFE: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION DEBATE (Peter K. Yu ed.,
forthcoming 2004).

167. See EC Copyright Term Directive, supranote 166, recital (5), arts. 1(1), 1(3), 2(2).
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1 69 pre-1978
large number of works, 168 including works-made-for-hire,
71
70
works.'
works,' and anonymous and pseudonymous
Consider sound recordings, for example. In the United States,
sound recordings are deemed works-made-for-hire and are protected for
ninety-five years. 72 In the European Union, recordings are protected for
only fifty years. 173 Recently, many sound recordings-including popular
1950s albums by such artists as Maria Callas, Ella Fitzgerald, and Elvis
Presley-have fallen into the public domain in Europe. 174 In response,
the United States recording industry has been calling for stronger
protection against parallel imports, those presumably cheaper foreign
goods imported without the authorization of the copyright holders. 175 As
the recording industry points out, it does not matter whether the
recordings are in the public domain abroad; as long as they remain

168. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also William F. Patry, The
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from
Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661, 661-62 (1996) (arguing that the copyright term
extension legislation would not create parity between European Union and United States authors);
J.H. Reichman, The Durationof Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 625, 626 (1996) (arguing that the copyright term extension legislation "cannot be justified
[as an exercise in] harmonization"). But see Constitutionalityof Copyright Term Extension, supra
note 152, at 690-91 (remarks of Prof Arthur R. Miller) (arguing that the Bono Act will create parity
between European Union and United States authors); id. at 698 (remarks of Prof. Jane Ginsburg)
(arguing that the international trade rationale provides a stronger justification for copyright term
extension than does the copyright rationale).
169. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 304(a)-(b) (2000), with EC Copyright Term Directive,
supranote 166, arts. 1(4), 2(2), 3(2)-(4).
170. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), with EC Copyright Term Directive, supra note 166, art.

1(1).
171. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 304(a)-(b), with EC Copyright Term Directive, supra note
166, art. 1(3).
172. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 304(a)-(b).
173. See EC Copyright Term Directive, supranote 166, art. 3.
174. See Anthony Tommasini, Companies in U.S. Sing Blues as Europe Reprises 50's Hits,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at Al.
175. For discussions of parallel imports, see generally Margreth Barrett, The United States'
Doctrine of Exhaustion: ParallelImports of Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911 (2000); Carl
Baudenbacher, TrademarkLaw and ParallelImports in a GlobalizedWorld-Recent Developments
in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the United States, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
645 (1999); Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray
Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373 (1994); Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in
Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1999); and Seth Lipner, Trademarked Goods and Their Gray
Market Equivalents: Should ProductDifferences Result in the Barringof UnauthorizedGoods from
the U.S. Markets?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1029 (1990).
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unauthorized importation of these
protected in the United States, any 176
recordings would be an act of piracy.
Moreover, the United States copyright term does not match up with
that of the other members of the international community, including its
neighbor Canada. A recent dispute over Peter Pan demonstrates this
disharmony. In 1904, Sir James Barrie wrote the play PeterPan.177 Two
decades later, Sir Barrie awarded the play's copyright to the Great
Ormond Street Hospital for Children in London. 178 A subsequent British
statute extended the hospital's royalty rights in perpetuity. 179 British law
notwithstanding, the play has fallen into the public domain in many
countries, including many member states of the Berne Convention. 80 In
those countries that adopted the Convention's statutory minimum-life
of the author plus fifty years for works created by an individual
author'8'-the copyright in Peter Pan would have expired in 1987, fifty
years after Sir Barrie's death.
Canadian author J.E. Somma recently published the book After the
Rain: A New Adventure for Peter Pan. 182 Although the book was
published in Canada, it is available to British and United States
customers via the Internet. To preempt legal action in the United States
by the British hospital, Somma filed suit in San Francisco in December
2002 seeking a declaratory judgment.' 83 While she claimed that the
characters in Peter Pan are now in the public domain, the British
hospital contended that the United States Copyright Act had extended
copyright protection for Peter Pan until 2023. 84 The court has yet to

176. See Tommasini, supra note 174 ("'The import of those products would be an act of
piracy.' . . . 'The industry is regretful that these absolutely piratical products are being released."'
(quoting Neil Turkewitz, Executive Vice President International of the RIAA)).
177. See JANET DUNBAR, J.M. BARRIE: THE MAN BEHIND THE IMAGE 170 (1970).
178. See id at 369, 392.
179. See Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 301 (Eng.); see also E. P.
SKONE JAMES ET AL., COPINGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 1-2 (13th ed. 1991) ("[T]he
1988 Act has created a new perpetual non-copyright right... to receive royalties in respect of
certain acts of exploitation of the play PeterPan by Sir James Matthew Barrie, notwithstanding that
the copyright in such work expired on December 31, 1987.").
180. Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last
revised in ParisJuly 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.

181. See id. art. 7(1); see also, e.g., Copyright Act, 1968, pt.It, div. 1, § 33(2) (Austl.)
(adopting life-plus-fifty-years copyright term); Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 6 (1985) (Can.)
(same).
182.

J.E. SOMMA, AFTER THE RAIN: A NEW ADVENTURE FOR PETER PAN (2002).

183. See Yu, Mickey Mouse, Peter Pan, supra note 104; Ian Stewart, "Peter Pan " Falls into
Clutches of Lawyers: Author Challenges Copyright Ruling, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 1, 2003,
at A6.
184. See id.
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rule on the case, and it is unclear whether Peter Pan can grow up in the

way Somma fantasized.
Although the European Union and the United States agree on the
need for strong international intellectual property protection, the
progress of copyright harmonization has been held back by the different
backgrounds and traditions of European and United States copyright
laws. While European copyright law was developed from the author's
right (droit d'auteur) tradition, which covers both personal and
from the utilitarian
economic rights, American copyright law emerged
185
tradition, which emphasizes economic rights.
Consider, for example, the protection of moral rights. 186 In Europe,
an author, as compared to a copyright holder, has a right to claim
authorship of the work and to prevent the use of his or her name as the
author of any work the author did not create. 187 The author also has the
right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of
the work if such action would damage his or her reputation. 8 8 Similar
protection is not available in the United States, except in works of visual
arts that exist in limited quantity, such
as paintings, drawings,
89
sculptures, and still photographic images.
The United States and the European Union also disagree over many
other copyright issues, including database protection, 190 fair use,' 9' the
185. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 165-96 (1994); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit
Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights. Literary Property
in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991-92 (1990); Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 516 (1985); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
UnitedStates and ContinentalCopyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 1-6 (1994).
186. For discussions of the tension between United States copyright and moral rights in
Europe, see the sources cited supra note 185 and Geri J. Yonover, The PrecariousBalance: Moral
Rights, Parody, andFair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 86-100 (1996).
187. See Netanel, supra note 185, at 34-37 (discussing the right of attribution).
188. See id. at 37-45 (discussing the right of integrity).
189. See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (providing limited moral rights to
visual art); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1998) (California Art Preservation Act); N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-14.59 (McKinney 1984) (New York Artists' Authorship Rights
Act).
190. For discussions of the expediency and constitutionality of United States database
protection legislation, see generally the sources cited supranote 156.
191. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an InternationalFair Use Doctrine,39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 75, 87 (2000) ("[A]n international fair use doctrine does not currently exist in the international
law of copyright.... [S]uch a doctrine is vital for effectuating traditional copyright policy in a
global market for copyrighted works as well as for capitalizing on the benefits of protecting
intellectual property under the free trade system."); Tyler G. Newby, Note, What's FairHere Is Not
Fair Everywhere: Does the American FairUse Doctrine Violate InternationalCopyright Law?, 5 1
STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1642 (1999) (discussing the distinctiveness of the fair use doctrine under
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first sale doctrine,

192

the work-made-for-hire

arrangement,'

93

and

environment. 194

protection against private copying in the digital
In light
of these differences, one might wonder if Eldred would change the tone
of the international harmonization debate.
Although the Eldred Court openly-and to some extent
uncharacteristically-embraced the need to harmonize United States
copyright law with that of the international community, its ruling shows
its strong and usual deference to Congress on the issue. 195 Such
deference is alarming, for it might make harmonization even more
difficult. While Congress, on occasion, might harmonize its laws with
those of the European Union or the international community, most of the
time it does not.196 Due to its strong interest in exporting intellectual
property-based products, the United States generally offers stronger
intellectual property protection than countries abroad. 9 By giving
United States copyright law). Compare Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse engineering for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the
unprotected functional elements of a computer program qualifies as fair use), with Council Directive
91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs art. 6, 1, 1991 O.J. (L
122) 42 (permitting reverse engineering only for the purpose of "obtain[ing] the information
necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
programs").
192. See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS,
InternationalIPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 335 (2000)
(discussing the disagreement over the exhaustion issue during the negotiation of the TRIPS
Agreement).
193. See Reichman, supra note 168, at 631-33 (arguing that "[a] more substantial discrepancy
between American copyright law and that of other Berne Union countries stems from the greater
reliance of the former on the work-made-for-hire doctrine in general and on the principle of
corporate authorship in particular").
194. Compare, e.g., Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) (2000)
(prohibiting manufacture, importation, and distribution of devices whose primary purpose or effect
is to circumvent copy-protection technology), with Directive 2001/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 6(2), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17
(requiring member states to provide "adequate legal protection" against the "manufacture, import,
distribution, sale, rental, advertisement ....or possession" of devices with the primary purpose or
effect of circumvention or which "are promoted, advertised, or marketed for the purpose of
circumvention").
195. See Hamilton, supra note 135, at 321-22, 335-46 (discussing how rare it is for the United
States Supreme Court to address constitutional issues in copyright cases).
196. See Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach About
Intellectual Property and InternationalTrade, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 218, 226-32 (2003).
197. The United States was instrumental in putting intellectual property on the international
trade agenda. See Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 337 (1996) (noting the United States' success
"in placing intellectual property on an arguably 'international' pedestal"); Reichman & Samuelson,
supra note 156, at 97 ("Universal intellectual property standards embodied in the TRIPS Agreement
had become enforceable within the framework of a World Trade Organization, largely as the result
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Congress strong deference, the Court therefore encourages lower courts
to uphold intellectual property statutes, even if they would isolate the
country from the global community or if they would violate international
norms.
A case in point is the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998
("FIMLA"),198 which the Court cited with approval in Eldred.199 Enacted
as a compromise between copyright holders and small business
enterprises, 20 0 the FIMLA amended section 110(5) of the United States
Copyright Act by exempting from royalties those restaurants, bars, and
retail stores that use "homestyle" audio and video equipment to play
broadcast music.

20 1

In 1999, a WTO dispute settlement panel found the

statute in violation of the United States' obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement. 202 In particular, the statute violated articles 1 lbis(1)(iii) and
1 1(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement.203 In view of this violation, the panel recommended that "the
Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to bring [the FIMLA]
20 4
into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement."
of sustained pressures by a coalition of powerful manufacturing associations in Europe, the United
States, and Japan." (footnote omitted)). To protect its economic interests, the country constantly has
applied pressure to induce foreign countries, in particular less developed countries, to reform their
intellectual property regimes. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a), 2412(b)(l)(A) (2000) (granting the United
States Trade Representative power to identify and investigate foreign nations that do not provide
adequate intellectual property protection or that deny American intellectual property goods fair or
equitable market access); Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term
Copyright Protectionfor U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 29, 39-50
(1995) (discussing the history and effectiveness of Special 301 actions in Taiwan, China, and
Thailand); Peter K. Yu, From Piratesto Partners: ProtectingIntellectual Propertyin China in the
Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140-54 (2000) (discussing the United States' success
in using section 301 sanctions to pressure China to reform its intellectual property regime).
198. Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 201-207, 112 Stat. 2830-34 (1998) (codified in part as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 110(5)(B), 504, 512, 513 (2000)).
199. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003).
200. See Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic
Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93, 102 (2000) (noting that the
FIMLA "split the difference between business interests who wanted a total exemption for secondary
uses of broadcast music and [performing rights organizations] and copyright owners who opposed
any relaxation of the homestyle exemption").
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000).
202. United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Report of the Panel, 7.1(b),
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter WTO Panel Report] (finding that the FIMLA violated
the TRIPS Agreement), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/1234da.pdf. For
excellent discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and
Incorporation of InternationalNorms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733
(2001); and Helfer, supranote 200.
203. See WTO Panel Report, supranote 202, 7.1(b).
204. Id. 7.2. Ironically, despite a negative finding in the WTO panel decision, the United
States refused to amend its copyright law and, instead, entered into an agreement with the European
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In the years to come, it will be interesting to see how the
"harmonization game" will play out. Will the United States change its
laws in an effort to harmonize them with those of foreign countries? Or
will other countries change their laws in an effort to harmonize them
with American law? If there is no harmonization, the entertainment
industry might face some new challenges from its foreign competitors.
IV. THE CHANGING TONE OF THE COPYRIGHT WAR
So far, the entertainment industry seems to be winning the war. As
commentators have noted, the MP3.com and Napster litigation signified
the end of what had been termed the "Wild, Wild West" era of the
Internet. 20 5 The copy-protection technologies and the DMCA also
provide the industry with the needed self-help protection that allows it to
adapt to the new environment. However, if one looks further, the Wild
Wild West is even wilder than it was two years ago. True, the recording
industry is no longer dealing with MP3.com and Napster. However, a
whole host of engines and services-such as Madster (formerly
Aimster), KaZaA, AudioGalaxy, Morpheus/MusicCity, Grokster, iMesh,
Filetopia, BearShare, BitTorrent, and LimeWire-has emerged, and
these "successors" can be used for the very same purposes as Napster.
In fact, from the industry's perspective, these engines are even
more problematic. Unlike MP3.com and Napster, many of these engines
and services do not have centralized servers.2 °6 Rather, they allow users
Union to submit to binding arbitration as permitted under article 25 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. See Phil Hardy, WTO Arbitrators Rule That US Should Pay $1.4m a Year to EU
Copyright Owners, MusIc & COPYRIGHT, Nov. 7, 2001. In November 2001, the arbitration panel
awarded EU copyright holders about $1.4 million per year for lost revenues caused by the FIMLA.
See United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Recourse to Arbitration Under Article
25 of the DSU
5.1,
WT/DS160/ARB25/1
(Nov.
9, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/160ar6 25_1 e.pdf. Although questions remain as to
how the United States government will fund the settlement and distribute the penalty money, the
manner in which this dispute was resolved will undeniably have long-lasting implications for the
development of the dispute resolution mechanism under the WTO. For discussion of events
occurring after the arbitration decision, see InternationalDevelopments, ENT. L. REP., Mar. 2002;
Settlement Between European Union and United States of WTO Fairness in Music Licensing Case
Appears to Have Fallen Apart, ENT. L. REP., Feb. 2002.
205. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the
Information Era, in PETER K. Yu, THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: TWENTY YEARS OF CARDOZO
ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL xiv (2001); Marci Hamilton, Bringing the People into the
Copyright Arena: How the New Awareness of Copyright Law Issues Can Help in Guarding the
Public'sDomain, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Mar. 29, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/200
10329.html [hereinafter Hamilton, Copyright Arena].
206. See Riehl, supra note 50, at 1773-79 (describing the architecture of gnutella-based
engines).
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to transfer files among various locations. Some of them, like Freenet,
also allow users to remain anonymous.2 °7 Thus, enforcement has become
a major problem, and the outcome of these battles becomes even harder
to predict. 20 8 The industry forced Napster to shut down its server, but
there is little the industry could do to deal with gnutella and its
uncountable successors.
Moreover, the transnational nature of the Internet might create
jurisdictional barriers that curtail the industry's litigation efforts. The
KaZaA litigation, for example, involves first Estonian developers, then a
Dutch company, and now Australian business executives in a company
incorporated in the South Pacific tax haven of Vanuatu.20 9 To make
things even more complicated, foreign countries might have different
laws, and their courts might come to different conclusions even when
they apply identical laws.2 0 Unless the recording industry is willing to
go after all the users (which would likely result in an enforcement fiasco
and a publicity disaster), piracy will remain rampant.
In recent years, the Eldred litigation and the public domain, free
software, and open source movements have created a tremendous
momentum toward a major change in copyright policy. As Professor
Marci Hamilton put it, if the consumers "were to ally .... and organize,
[with the open sourcers] together they could be a powerful
movement." 21'1Thus, regardless of how disappointing one would find the
decision, Eldred might not be what Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan called
the "'Dred Scott case for culture."' 212 After all, the case, as the Court
stated in the opening sentence, is about the scope of Congress's power

207. See id. at 1779-87 (describing the architecture of Freenet).
208. Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (upholding the legality of Grokster and Morpheus/MusicCity), with the
Napster litigation as discussed supranotes 50-75 and accompanying text.
209. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, File Swapper Eluding Pursuers, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2002, at
Al. But see Michael Geist, In Web Disputes, U.S. Law Rules the World, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 24,

2003, at DI (noting that United States laws were applied in most Internet disputes).
210. See Yu, supra note 196, at 23241; see also COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 114 (2003) (noting that "it is not

uncommon for different courts in Europe, even when applying identical law, to come to different
conclusions on whether a patent is or is not obvious"); Patti Waldmeir, Material Publishedon the
Internet and Thus Accessible Anywhere in the World Is Increasingly Being Challenged Under the
Laws of Individual Nation States, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2002, at 19 (noting the increasing
willingness of national courts to assert jurisdiction over activities conducted on the Internet).
211. Hamilton, supra note 104.
212. Siva Vaidhyanathan, After the Copyright Smackdown: What Next? (Jan. 17, 2003), at

http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/01/17/copyright/print.html.
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"to prescribe the duration of copyrights." 213 It is not about whether the
public can use copyrighted works during the prescribed period.
Copyright has always been a balancing act. Indeed, the public
interest safeguards-such as the idea-expression dichotomy, the first
sale doctrine, and the fair use privilege-are "just as important as the
grant of the right itself."214 Thus, any change in one area of the copyright
system could easily be offset by an opposite change in another area of
the system. For example, increased copyright protection could be offset
by an expanded reading of the fair use provision or the miscellaneous
exemptions contained in the Copyright Act. In fact, some lower courtsespecially those sympathetic to the Eldred cause-might be willing to
adjust the existing copyright scheme in an effort to offset the effects of
an extended copyright term.215
Thanks to the MP3.com, Napster, Eldred, and KaZaA litigation,
public awareness of intellectual property issues has increased
considerably.216 In the past, copyright law was considered a complicated
issue that was only of primary interest and concern to intellectual
property lawyers, legal scholars, technology developers, and copyright
holders.2 17 Today, members of the public increasingly see it as
something that affects their daily lives.2 18 As political support grew,
legislative proposals that placed a heavier emphasis on the protection of
the public domain surfaced. For example, Congressman Richard
Boucher introduced the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act to restore
the historical balance in copyright law and to ensure proper labeling of
copy-protected CDs.219 Senator Sam Brownback circulated among
consumer groups and within the Senate a draft bill requiring copyright
holders to file suits before obtaining the identities of alleged infringers

213. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192 (2003).
214. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996).
215. See Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension, supra note 152, at 701 (remarks of
Prof Jane Ginsburg) (expressing concern that, if the Court were to uphold the Bono Act, the
decision might invite lower courts to further adjust the existing copyright scheme in an effort to
offset the effects of a longer copyright term).
216. See, e.g., Hamilton, Copyright Arena, supra note 205.
217. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User Friendly?, 25 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 71, 71 (2001) (arguing that "[c]opyright law is too complicated and counterintuitive ... [and]
has been written by and for copyright lawyers").
218. See Hamilton, CopyrightArena, supra note 205.
219. See Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.
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from Internet service providers.22 ° Most recently, Reps. Zoe Lofgren and
John Doolittle introduced the Public Domain Enhancement Act, which,
if enacted, would require copyright holders to pay a one-dollar fee to
maintain their copyrights fifty years after the original publication of their
221
works.
Scholars and commentators also have paid increasing attention to
access issues and have proposed safeguards to limit copyright protection.
For example, Professor Ann Bartow advocated the adaptation of "preexisting real space copyright use norms to electronic formats as a
mechanism for protecting the legitimate interests of copyright owners
without depriving individuals of the customary real space access to
information provided by bound books and periodicals." 222 Professor
Yochai Benkler advocated the use of Justice Louis Brandeis's concept
that information should be "'free as the air to common use"' to limit
property rights in information products.22 3 Professor Julie Cohen
advocated the recognition of the right to read anonymously.224 Professor
Niva Elkin-Koren argued that users must be allowed "to do the same
things they are able to do in a non-digitized environment." 225 Professor
Marci Hamilton noted the need to construct a "free use zone" that will
"mak[e] explicit what is already accepted practice in a hard copy
universe-that copyright owners do not have rights to prohibit
individuals from browsing and borrowing their works." 226 Professor
Lawrence Lessig called for significant term limits to copyright
protection.227 And Professor Diane Zimmerman emphasized the
220. See Consumers, Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act of
2003, S. 1621, 108th Cong.; see also Farhad Manjoo, Can Anyone Stop the Music Cops?, (June 17,
2003), at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/06/17/brownbackbill/.
221. See Public Domain Enhancement Act § 3(c), H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003); see also
Brian Krebs, Bill Seeks to Loosen Copyright Law's Grip (June 25, 2003), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32488-2003Jun25.html.
222. Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book,
48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 18 (2003).
223. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 355 (1999) (quoting Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
224. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 1003-04.
225. Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright
Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 277 (1996).
226. Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 631 (1996).
227. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 27, at 251 (proposing a regime whereby a published work
will be protected for a term of five years once registered, the registration can be renewed fifteen
times, and the work will fall into the public domain if the registration is not renewed); Lawrence
Lessig, ProtectingMickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at A 17 (proposing a
scheme whereby copyright holders will have to pay a tax fifty years after a work is published and
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importance of providing exceptions for scholarship and scientific
research.228
Finally, some citizens might consider civil disobedience in the
name of justice (or in the name of poor Mickey, who-as noted by a
humor columnist-is denied sex, drugs, and cigarettes by its copyright
holder and the Bono Act).229 Shortly after the Court handed down the
Eldred decision, strong, bitter reactions emerged from supporters of the
public domain movement.230 While many believed the Court had sold
them out to private corporations, like Disney, the more radical ones
advocated civil disobedience as a counteracting strategy.231 In fact, long
before the public debate on copyright term extension heated up,
visionary commentators had considered MP3s "a kind of protest
movement against record companies, which many artists hate because
they control access to the music market. ' '232 Nonetheless, civil
disobedience is generally discouraged, regardless of how strong one
believes in the need to protect the public domain and maintain balance
between copyright holders and the users at large; indeed, that was the
reason why Eldred was brought in the first place.233

that the work will fall into the public domain if the copyright holder fails to pay the tax for three
years in a row); The Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ, at http://www.eldred.cc/ea-faq.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (discussing the scheme).
228. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw Out the Public
Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 405 (noting the need to "maintain[]
some approximation of our current cheap and simple access to copyrighted works for research,
scholarship and pleasure"); see also Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 156, at 113-24 (discussing
the adverse impact of sui generis database protection on scientific research and education);
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 156, at 796-821 (discussing the adverse impact of database
protection laws on scientific, technical, and educational users of factual data and information).
229. See Jesse Walker, Mickey Mouse Clubbed, REASONONLINE (Jan. 17, 2003), at
http://reason.com/links/links0l1703.shtml.
230. See, e.g., Ken Paulson, Copyright Extensions Put Profits Ahead of the Public (Jan. 26,
2003), at http://firstamendmentcenter.org//commentary.aspx?id=2205.
231. See Lord Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841)
(cautioning that an ill-advised copyright law eventually would be "repealed by piratical
booksellers"), reprinted in EXTENDING MICKEY'S LIFE: ELDRED v. ASHCROFT AND THE COPYRIGHT

TERM EXTENSION DEBATE (Peter K. Yu ed., forthcoming 2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Deathof
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct, 87 VA.
L. REV. 813, 869-70 (2001) (suggesting that "civil disobedience may offer the only effective means
for ordinary consumers to express their political discontent with copyright's excessive scope"). But
see Vaidhyanathan, supra note 212 (discouraging acts of civil disobedience by noting that "[w]hile
disobedience might be more fun, the power of civil discourse remains" in the post-Eldred era).
232. The Big Five Hit the Web, ECONOMIST, May 8-14, 1999, at 63.
233. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1066
(2001).
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V.

WHAT SHOULD THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

A.

Do?

Stop FightingMulti-front Wars

First of all, the entertainment industry should stop its futile attempt
to fight multi-front wars. Today, because of the emergence of digital
technology and the Internet, peer-to-peer networks have caused major
headaches for artists, songwriters, photographers, publishers, film
producers, software developers, and other copyright holders. To fight
pirates and protect its economic interests, the entertainment industry has
deployed many different battle strategies, including lobbying, litigation,
self-help, education, and licensing. 34
The industry was winning in the beginning, but its latest efforts
have become increasingly futile, disorganized, and counterproductive.
Although the industry initially boasted about its latest encryption
technologies,235 those technologies were cracked,236 and the industry has
had to resort to other low-technology or unconventional protective
measures. For example, when Epic Records distributed ieview copies of
Tori Amos, Pearl Jam, and AudioSlave albums in 2002, the label sent
them inside portable CD players that had been glued shut.237 What an
innovative protective technology! Likewise, before Madonna released
her new single, American Life, the label started circulating a spoofed
version of the song on the Internet, featuring the singer saying "'What
the f

do you think you're doing?'

' 238

Unfortunately for the label, that

strategy backfired when a hacker made MP3 copies of every song on the
album available for download when the hacker took over Madonna's
website. 239 Angry fans also responded by remixing Madonna's tirade
234. See supra Part I (discussing the various battle strategies).
235. For example, the Secure Digital Music Initiative Foundation, an association of electronic
companies involved in designing copy-protection technologies, issued a public challenge

in

September 2000, offering ten thousand dollars to those who successfully cracked their proposed
copy-protection technologies. SDMI described its public challenge in a press release as follows:
So here's the invitation: Attack the proposed technologies. Crack them.
By successfully breaking the SDMI

protected content, you will play a role in

determining what technology SDMI will adopt. And there is something more in it for
you, too. If you can remove the watermark or defeat the other technology on our
proposed copyright protection system, you may earn up to $10,000.
SDMI,

An

Open

Letter to

the

Digital Community

(Sept.

6,

2000),

available at

http://www.sdmi.org/pr/OLSept_6_2000htm.
236. See supranote 25.
237. See James Sullivan, A Sticky Situation, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 2002, at 31; Josh Tyrangiel,
Pirates,Beware: This CD Stays Put, TIME MAG., Oct. 14, 2002, at 27.

238. Id. at 66.
239.

See id
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with other songs.240 Some websites even held contests for these
remixes.24 1
In April 2003, the recording industry won Recording Industry
Association ofAmerica v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc. ,242 requiring the
Internet service provider to hand over names of individuals whom the
industry accused of illegally trading music.

243

(The United States Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit subsequently overruled
that decision.24 4) However, on the next day, it lost an important case on
Grokster and Morpheus/Music City, risking an unfavorable precedent
upholding the legality of peer-to-peer file-sharing technology.24 5
In the same month, the major record companies filed high-profile
lawsuits against students at Princeton University, Michigan
Technological University, and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, seeking
billions of dollars in damages. 246 Yet, they created an anti-climax when
they settled with the student defendants for meager amounts.24 7 More
ironically, one student was able to raise his entire twelve-thousand-dollar
fine in less than six weeks over the Internet, while another was working
his way to complete a similar feat.248
240. See Nik Bonopartis, Firms Say the Swap Must Stop, POUGHKEEPSIE J. (N.Y.), July 16,
2003, at IA.
241. See id.
242. 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), rev'd, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
243. See id at 246, 275.
244. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
245. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
246. See Frank Ahrens, 4 Students Sued Over Music Sites, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2003, at El;
Katie Dean, RIAA Hits Students Where It Hurts, WIRED NEWS (Apr. 5, 2003), at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,58351,00.html (reporting the RIAA's charges "that
one network operator distributed 27,000 music files, while the other three students ran networks
offering 500,000 music files, 650,000 files and over I million files"); Jon Healey, Students Hit with
Song Piracy Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at CI. For the individual complaints, see Compl.,
Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Jordan, No. 03-CV-0417 (N.D.N.Y Apr. 3, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/riaa/arcojordan4O3O3cmp.pdf;
Compl., Atlantic Recording
Corp. v. Nievelt, No. 2:03CV0064 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/riaa/arconievelt403O3micmp.pdf; Compl., Atlantic Recording
Corp. v.
Peng, No.
03-1441
(SRC)
(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/riaa/arcopeng4O3O3njcmp.pdf;
Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
Sherman,
No.
03-CV-0416
(N.D.N.Y.
Apr.
3,
2003),
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/riaa/arcosherman403O3nycmp.pdf.
247. Jon Healey & P.J. Huffstutter, 4 Pay Steep Pricefor Free Music, L.A. TIMES, May 2,
2003, at § 1, 1 (reporting that students will pay the recording industry damages in the range of
$12,000 to $17,500).
248. See Jefferson Graham, FinedStudent Gets Donationsto Tune of $12K, USA TODAY, June
25, 2003, at 4D.
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More recently, the recording industry launched a mass litigation
campaign against file swappers who made large number of songs
available on peer-to-peer networks. 249 Since September 2003, the
recording industry has filed several rounds of lawsuits, suing more than
two thousand individuals suspected of swapping music illegally via
peer-to-peer networks.25 ° Understandably, the industry needs to protect
artists aggressively against Internet pirates. However, its aggressive
tactics might result in public backlashes while causing collateral
damages, such as invasion of privacy.2 5'
In fact, the RIAA has had to apologize for issuing erroneous takedown notices. In one episode, it sent a notice to Speakeasy, a national
broadband provider, alleging that one of Speakeasy's subscriber sites
2' 52
had illegally "'offer[ed] approximately 0 sound files for download.'
Approximately zero! In another episode, the industry--or, to be more
precise, its automated web-crawlers--confused Usher the rhythm-andblues performer with Peter Usher, a retired astronomy and astrophysics
professor at Pennsylvania State University who stored on the
departmental server an a cappella song about a gamma ray satellite.253
The RIAA later withdrew, and apologized for, the faulty copyright
notice, which it attributed to a temporary employee.254 The trade group

249. See Jefferson Graham, Swap Songs? You May Be on Record Industry's Hit List, USA
TODAY, July 22, 2003, at ID.
250. For reports of the recording industry's lawsuits, see Amy Harmon, The Price of Music:
The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al (261 lawsuits); Record Industry Files 80 More
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at C6 (80 lawsuits); Music Industry Files More Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at C9 (41 lawsuits); John Schwartz, Music Industry Returns to Court,Altering
Tactics on File Sharing,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at Cl (532 lawsuits); More Downloading Suits
by Recording Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at C3 (531 lawsuits); John Schwartz, More
Lawsuits Filedin Effort to Thwart File Sharing,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at C4 (532 lawsuits);
Brock Read, Record Companies Sue People at 14 Colleges for Alleged Music Piracy, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., May 7, 2004, at A33 (477 lawsuits).
25 1. See Sonia K. Katyal, A War on CD Piracy, a War on Our Rights, L.A. TIMES, June 27,
2003, at § 2, 17.
252. Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for ErroneousLetters, CNET NEWS.COM (May 13,
2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-1001319.html (quoting the RIAA's form letter).
253. As Declan McCullagh described:
The department has on its faculty a professor emeritus named Peter Usher whose work
on radio-selected quasars the FTP site hosted. The site also had a copy of an a capella
song performed by astronomers about the Swift gamma ray satellite, which Penn State
helped to design.
The combination of the word "Usher" and the suffix ".mp3" had triggered the
RIAA's automated copyright crawlers.
Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, CNET NEWS.COM, (May 12, 2003), at
http://news.com.coml2100-1025_3-1001095.html.
254. See id.
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also added that it would send Professor2 Usher
an Usher CD and T-shirt
55
"'in appreciation of his understanding.'
So far the entertainment industry has tried many different strategies
to combat piracy. 256 Yet, most of them were ill-conceived, making the
industry's efforts look hurried, confused, disorganized, and somewhat
desperate. Instead of directing its energy toward the pirates, the industry
has been fighting battles everywhere-against telecommunications
service providers, consumer electronics developers, new media
entrepreneurs, corporate employers, universities, lawyers, college
researchers, hackers and cryptographers, students, legal scholars, civil
liberty organizations, and ultimately consumers. What began as a war on
piracy has now become a war against the whole world. No country has
ever won a war by fighting battles on all fronts.257 Not Napoleon's
France. Not Hitler's Germany. The entertainment industry should take
heed of this aphorism. Rather than using every weapon in its arsenal, it
might be well advised to reconsider where and how it fights its battles.
B. Bridge the CopyrightDivide
A robust and dynamic copyright regime requires support, and
problems arise when support is lacking. Today, a copyright divide exists
between those who have stakes in the copyright regime and those who
do not.258 While the stakeholders are eager to protect what they have, the
nonstakeholders neither understand nor believe in the copyright system.
As a result, the stakeholders and nonstakeholders battle against each
other over the change and retention of the status quo. Unless the
nonstakeholders understand why copyright needs to be protected and
until they become stakeholders or potential stakeholders, they will not be
eager to comply with copyright laws and consent to stronger copyright
protection.
To help bridge the copyright divide, the entertainment industry can
focus its remedial efforts in four areas. First, the industry must educate
the nonstakeholders about the copyright system. It needs to make the
nonstakeholders understand what copyright is, how copyright is
protected, and why they need to protect such property. The industry also
255.
256.

Id.
See EntertainmentIndustry Widens War, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2003, at D9.
Cf ERIC HOBSBAWM, ON THE EDGE OF THE NEW CENTURY 49 (Allan Cameron trans.,

257.
2000) (cautioning that it is "a dangerous gamble" and "a mistake" for a single power, however great
and powerful it is, to control world politics).
258. See generally Yu, supra note 100; Peter K. Yu, FourMisconceptions of Copyright Piracy,
26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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needs to show the nonstakeholders the benefits of copyright protectionhow such protection can help them and how the lack thereof can hurt
them. As a recent study by the National Research Council stated, "[a]
better understanding of the basic principles of copyright law would lead
to greater respect for this law and greater willingness to abide by it, as
well as produce a more informed public better able to engage in
259
discussions about intellectual property and public policy.
Second, the industry needs to transform the nonstakeholders into
stakeholders or potential stakeholders by helping them develop a stake in
the system and understand how they can get their products protected and
royalties paid. So far, the industry has a difficult time explaining why the
general public has a stake in the copyright system. Although the industry
has repeatedly extolled the benefits of strong copyright protection and
how such protection can induce artists to create music, movies, and other
entertainment products, the industry's rhetoric was lost on most
consumers.
Fortunately, the industry has begun to adopt other strategies to
attract consumers. For example, some software manufacturers offer postsale benefits that are not available to purchasers of counterfeit goods,
such as warranty service, replacement part guarantees, free upgrades,
and contests or giveaways.26 ° Some music publishers also include
special photos, files, and interviews on password-protected websites that
are made only accessible to purchasers of legitimate CDs. 26 1 Some
courageous publishers even compete directly against the pirates by
upgrading the quality of their products, thus making their reproduction
more expensive (and less profitable for the pirates).262

259.

DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 18, at 16-17; see also INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK

FORCE, supranote 18, at 208 (outlining the controversial "just say yes" campaign to licensing).
260. See Doris Estelle Long, China'sIP Reforms Show Little Success, IP WORLDWIDE, Nov.Dec. 1998, at 6 (arguing that post-sale benefits would create incentives for the Chinese to buy
legitimate products).
261. For example, Gracenote CDKey allows CD owners to unlock bonus tracks, exclusive
links, contests, and other bonus content. See What is CDKey?, at http://www.cdkeypromotions.com/cdkeyabout.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
262. As one pair of commentators recounted:
One joint venture publishing company which publishes popular comics chose to
compete directly against their pirates. Beyond wrapping the magazine in hard-toreproduce plastic, the company has continuously upgraded the quality of the comic's
graphics and paper relative to pirate editions, and included inexpensive, educational
prizes with each issue. These gambits have worked. Despite being significantly more
expensive than the pirated version, this popular comic book has seen increasing
subscriptions and readership, and the company is planning to expand its operations.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:907

Warner Brothers's recent change of strategy toward Harry Potter
fan sites provides an illustrative example. In December 2000, Warner
Brothers threatened to sue a fifteen-year-old English schoolgirl, Claire
Field,
over
her
website
and
domain
name,
2
63
www.harrypotterguide.co.uk.
In response, Field and others organized
a boycott of Harry Potter merchandise in protest through another
website, potterwar.org.uk. 26 The studio eventually backed down.265
Since the incident, Warner Brothers changed its position toward fan
sites. Instead of antagonizing Harry Potter fans, Warner Brothers now
tries to bring them into the fold. To do so, the studio created a
Webmaster Community page on its official site,266 allowing fans to
enroll their unofficial sites and to download official banners, shields, and
seals.26 7
Third, the industry must help develop intellectual property laws and
strengthen enforcement mechanisms. Today, although most countries
have intellectual property laws that conform to international standards,
very few have adequate mechanisms to enforce those laws. 268 Thus, the
industry needs to work with the United States government and
policymakers in those countries to strengthen intellectual property laws
and develop effective enforcement mechanisms.
While the United States government had used coercive tactics in the
past to induce, if not compel, foreign countries to change their laws in
the American image, past experience suggests that such changes would
not be complete and sustainable until those countries consider

John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based
Approach to IPR Protection in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE

409,432 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
263. See Harry and the Web Wars, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 25, 2001, at E6.
264. The protest website is no longer accessible. For more information about the history of the
protest website and an interview with its webmaster, see The Bringers, The PotterwarCampaign, at
http://web.ukonline.co.uk/bringers/temp/c-potter.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2004).
265. See Warner Conjures up Trouble, NEW MEDIA AGE (U.K.), Apr. 12, 2001, at 34.
266. See PLATFORM 9%, at http://harrypotter.wamerbros.com/platform/index.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2004).
267. See id.; see also James Norman, Copyright Issues Become Kids' Stuff, AGE (Melbourne),
May 7, 2002, at 3.
268.

See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE

REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 58 (2003) (noting that significant problems remain with
enforcement
of
intellectual
property
laws
in
China),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2003/china.pdf; see also J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement
Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperationwith the Developing Countries?,32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 441,450 (2000) ("[T]he bulk of the developing countries appear behind schedule in implementing
the TRIPS Agreement .... [The] costs of building and staffing intellectual property systems...
constitute a palpable drain on very scarce resources.") (footnotes omitted)).
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themselves stakeholders or potential stakeholders in the international
intellectual property system.269 Thus, the entertainment industry should
work together with its foreign counterparts to increase the public
awareness of intellectual property rights. For example, the Business
Software Alliance and the Chinese Software Alliance successfully
promoted the use of original software in China by teaming up
together. 270 Thanks to these efforts, many Chinese no longer see
copyright protection as alien, abstract, and incomprehensible. Rather,
they consider these rights closely related to their daily lives and the
country's domestic growth and international reputation.2 71
In addition, the industry can work together to develop digital rights
management tools that help enable and manage transactions made in the
online world. When the Internet was first developed, commentators
discussed how the new environment allowed for the creation of a
"celestial jukebox., 272 Although this jukebox has yet to materialize in
the form commentators envisioned and the Internet has made
enforcement difficult at times,

273

new communications technologies

provide effective ways for copyright holders to enforce their rights and
collect royalties.
Finally, the industry must help develop iegitimate alternatives if
products are needed, yet unaffordable, by the local people. As Gene
269.

See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 12-13 (1998) (noting the sharp distinction between overt coercion and
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note 268, at 463-67; Yu, supra note 197, at 207-11; Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives:An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property
Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 71-72 (2001).
270.

See INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, 2002 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35-36, available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2002/2002SPEC301PRC.pdf
(discussing how the Business Software Alliance and the Chinese Software Alliance will jointly
supervise the Chinese Government's agreement to use only legal software).
271.
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29 (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property No. 11,2002).
272. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 185, at 199.
273. See, e.g., PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY,
AND THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 100 (2001) (noting that "officials normally find it far more
difficult to silence critical voices on the new media compared with their ability to regulate and
control the TV airwaves"); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage,
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INFRASTRUCTURE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (discussing the difficulties of
censorship on the Internet); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-TheRise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1373-74 (1996) (describing how efforts to control the flow of
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Hoffman, the CEO of Emusic, Inc., said, "'[w]e think the best way to
stop piracy is to make music so cheap it isn't worth copying.', 274 In
April 2003, Apple Computer unveiled its iTunes Music Store.275 Since
its opening, the service has sold more than 50 million songs,276 and
customers seem to be satisfied with the service.277 It nevertheless
remains interesting to see how the service will develop. Unless record
companies are willing to provide content, the iTunes service eventually
might end up with the same fate as other earlier subscription-based
services, which failed to attract substantial interest from consumers.278
To fight piracy, some copyright holders also have used bargain
pricing to make products more affordable in foreign markets. 279 For
example, some movie studios have released low-priced audiovisual
products dubbed in the local language or with added foreign-language
subtitles.28 ° On the one hand, these bargain products are able to provide
an affordable alternative that accommodates local needs. On the other
hand, by dubbing the products in the local language or including
subtitles, the studios successfully make the products unappealing to
English-speaking consumers. This strategy therefore successfully
prevents the discounted products from entering the English-speaking
world as parallel imports.2 8'
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C. Adopt a Nonzero-sum Approach to
IntellectualProperty DisputeResolution
Today, the copyright wars have antagonized consumers, making
their relationship with the entertainment industry increasingly hostile.
Consider the following imaginary conversation between two people
using maritime radios:
FIRST SPEAKER

Please divert your course 15 degrees to the north to

avoid a collision, over.
SECOND SPEAKER

Recommend you divert YOUR course 15 degrees,

over.
FIRST SPEAKER

This is the captain of a US Navy ship. I say again,

divert your course, over.
SECOND SPEAKER No, I say again, divert YOUR course, over.
FIRST SPEAKER This is an aircraft carrier of the US Navy. We are a
large warship. Divert your course now! Over.
282
SECOND SPEAKER This is a lighthouse, your call.

This conversation not only captures well the tone of the current
copyright
war,
but provides
valuable
lessons
on
the
counterproductiveness of the belligerent tactics used by the
entertainment industry.
Commentators always talk about how society needs authors, and
how some authors would take up more remunerative jobs-perhaps as
copyright lawyers?-if they were not compensated for their creative
efforts. The converse is also true. Authors need fans and customers, just
as ships need lighthouses. Thus, the entertainment industry should cast
aside its belligerent tactics and battle strategies and consider what I
called the "nonzero-sum approach" to intellectual property dispute
resolution. 283 In game theory terms, a zero-sum game is a game in which
a player's gain must result in another player's loss. If one wins, the other
must lose. By contrast, in a nonzero-sum game, a player's gain will not
necessarily result in another player's loss. Instead, there will be a winwin solution.
To be certain, the zero-sum approach does not necessarily result in
confrontation, as parties might still cooperate through accommodation
282.
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and compromises, thus allowing them to split the difference by giving up
something valuable and by sharing the pain of losing.284 However, the
nonzero-sum approach is generally more preferable. It not only will
create forward-looking solutions that provide mutual benefits to all the
parties involved, but also will preserve the hard-earned relationships
between the disputing parties.285
Notwithstanding the usefulness of this approach, we should not
forget its limitations and ignore other equally appealing solutions.286 In
Getting to Yes, 287 a book widely studied by students of conflict
resolution, Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury discussed how to
resolve a dispute between two children quarreling over an orange. 288
Instead of dividing the orange in half or giving one child an apple-or
maybe two-Fisher and Ury reminded us the need to understand what
each child wants. 289 As they explained, perhaps one child might want
only the fruit to eat, while the other might want only the peel for baking
a cake.2 90 By giving each of them what he or she wants, as compared to
half of what each of them does not want, the parent might be able to find
a nonzero-sum solution that is mutually beneficial to both children.29'
Although this nonzero-sum approach is insightful and works well
in theory, there are many cases in which the approach is unsatisfactory.
For example, it would be hard to imagine that every child fighting for an
orange would want only the fruit to eat or only the peel for baking a
cake. Most of the time, they fight because they want the same thing.
Consumers want free music; yet, artists and record companies want to
get paid. Moreover, as conflict resolution scholars pointed out, value
creating in the nonzero-sum approach and value claiming in the zerosum approach "are linked parts of negotiation. Both processes are
present. No matter how much creative problem solving enlarges the pie,
' 292
it must still be divided; value that has been created must be claimed.
Indeed, the interaction of the tactics used to create or claim value might
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further exacerbate
the tension between the cooperative and competitive
3
moves.

29

In sum, the nonzero-sum approach has its limitations and might not
work in every situation. Yet, the entertainment industry should always
keep this option in mind. A nonzero-sum solution not only would benefit
all the parties involved, but also would help reconcile the increasingly
confrontational relationships between the industry and consumers.
Maybe a copyright war is not what society needs. Maybe a copyright
war is not what consumers want. Let's hope the industry will eventually
figure that out.
CONCLUSION

When the digital copyright war first started, the entertainment
industry was winning most of the battles. Notwithstanding these early
victories, the war is now expanding and has become even more difficult
for the industry to fight than it was a year ago. Today, copyright law is
no longer a complicated issue that is only of interest and concern to
copyright lawyers, legal scholars, technology developers, and copyright
holders. Rather, it is a matter of public significance, affecting all of us in
our daily lives. The ground has shifted. If the entertainment industry
does not pay attention to the public and if it continues to use ill-advised
battle strategies, it eventually might lose the war.
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